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CORPORATE PROXIES*
Leonard H. Axe t

F

OLLOWING a discussion of the historical development of the
right and power to vote by proxy, this article examines the cases dealing with the regulation by by-law of the right to vote by proxy, who may
act as proxy holders, and the form of the proxy. Emphasis is placed upon
the practical aspects of the execution of proxies and the duties of inspectors of elections. A number of additional topics will be discussed in
a second installment: the persons entitled to appoint proxy holders, the
right to examine proxies, the scope of authority conferred and exercise
of power, circumstances under which a stockholder is bound by his
proxy holder's unauthorized acts, and revocation and termination
of proxies.

I
THE ORIGIN AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PROXY VOTING

A. The Right to Vote by Proxy at Common Law
At common law a stockholder has no right to cast his vote by
proxy at corporate meetings, in the absence of special authorization.1In explaining how the rule evolved, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia said, in Walker v. J ohnson,Z

*

This article is a portion of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
_
.
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law.
The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Howard Petersen of
the bar of New York City and· to Mr. Bernard D. Broeker, formerly of the bar of
New York City and now a member of the legal staff of the Bethlehem Steel Company,
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, who read this dissertation and contributed valuable suggestions. Also, the writer wishes to thank Mr. H. H. Pell, Jr., Secretary, The Columbia
Gas and Electric Company, for the information in respect to the mechanics of actual
proxy voting.
In particular the writer is indebted to Professor Laylin K. James, School of
Law, University of Michigan, whose encouragement was an inspiration to carry the
_
study through to completion.
•
In all fairness to those who read the manuscript, the writer assumes full responsibility for all ideas and conclusions <:Xpressed.
A.B., Baker University; LL.B., University of Kansas; S.J.D., University of
Michigan. Professor of Business Law, School of Business, University of Kansas.-Ed.
1 Special authorization may be of two kinds, ( 1) authorization by charter or
article of incorporation (see, infra, p. 41), and (2) authorization by by-law (see infra,
p. 42). However, in some jurisdictions authorization in the by-law alone is not sufficient to create the right to vote by proxy, but must be sanctioned by some provision
in the charter or articles of incorporation (see, infra, p. 45 f.).
2 17 D. C. App. 144 (1900).
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"The common-law rule in respect of voting by proxy had its
origin in reasons peculiarly applicable to the earlier forms of corporations, namely, municipal and charitable corporations. Membership in these was coupled with no pecuniary interest. The
voting privilege was in the nature of a personal trust, committed
to the discretion of the member as an individual, and hence not
susceptible of exercise through delegation."
The earlier forms of corporations in England seem to have been political units and the normal mode of conferring corporate rights was by an
issue of a charter from the crown, whereby a body of individuals was
designated a corporation with the sovereign power to exercise appropriate privileges. 3 Since the charter was issued by the crown, the corporation was considered a part of the government and each member of
the corporation was entitled to one vote if given by him in person. As
one writer has so well stated, this "was the result of a political philosophy which assumed that every man had an equal interest in good
government and that the highest governmental wisdom, in the form of
the decision of the majority, would result from the clash of these
interests." 4 The conclusion seems inescapable that the root of the
common-law rule in respect of voting stems in the legal principles
which developed when political corporations were the prevailing type,
and it seems only natural that the standards which had been formulated
for these early corporations should be carried over to business corporations with the result that voting by proxy was not permitted.
As early as 1607, the question of voting by proxy came before the
King's Courts in Ireland in the case of Re Dean and Chapter of
F ernes.1'' In this case the Bishop of Fernes had demised his ecclesiastical
possession to Allen, the defendant, but it could have no operation at
law as a lease until it was confirmed by the vote of the dean and chapter
of Fernes. The dean, on going abroad, had appointed one Gray as his
proxy to give his assent to all leases and grants, and Gray had expressed
the dean's assent to the lease, under the seal of the deanery. The court
held that it was a rule of the canon law that a vote could not be given
by proxy, and decided that the common law agreed with the canon law
on this point, "But where a corporation will pass any interest, the coma Wiliiston, "History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800," 2
HARv. L. REv. 105 at 121 (1888). See also, l DAVIS, CoRPORATIONS---THEIR ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT 92-129 (1905); I DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CoRPORATIONS 6-8 (1917); Bergerman, "Voting Trusts and Non-Voting
Stock," 37 YALE L. J. 445 (1928).
4
Bergerman, "Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock," 37 YALE L. J. 445 at 447
(1928).
11 Davies Rep. II 6 ( l 607) ( quotation from p. l 29).
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mon law will not suffer the members of the corporation to give their
assent by proctors or substitutes."
This rule of the common Jaw has been applied as well to trading
or business corporations. In Philips v. Wickham,6 the New York court
expressed the opinion that there was no common-law right to vote by
proxy on shares of stock in a corporation. There, by way of dicta, since
the right to vote by proxy is declared not necessarily to arise because
the use of the proxies did not change the result of the election, the
Chancellor said,
·
"The right of voting by proxy is not a general right, and t4e
party who claims it, must show a special authority for that purpose. The only case in which it is allowable, at common law, is by
the peers of England, and that is said to be in virtue of a special
permission of the king."
In the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel. Verree v. Bringhurst 1 a stockholder presented the proxy of another stockholder who
owned one hundred twenty-five shares in the Philadelphia Iron and
Steel Company and offered to vote the same_ at a stated annual meeting
of the company. The vot~ by proxy was received by the inspectors of
the election under protest. Upon quo warranto proceedings to determine
the right of defendants to hold the office of director, the court held that
members of a corporation had no right to vote by proxy at a corporate
election, unless such right was expressly conferred by the charter or by a
by-law. So, also, in Harben v. Phillips,8 the English Court of Chancery stated that proxies could not be used at common law by a member of a corporation unless some specific provision enabled him to do so.
That stockholders of private corporations have no inherent common-law right to cast their votes by proxy thus seems to be well settled."
6 I Paige (N. Y.) 590 at 597-598 (1829). This case was followed in People v.
Twadell, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 427 (1879); Hart v. Sheridan, 168 Misc. 386, 5 N. Y. S.
(2d) 820 (1938).
7 103 Pa. St. 134 (1883). In this case the attorneys for the plaintiffs in error
contended that the rule of the common law, established w!ien municipal, religious, and
charitable corporations were alone known, had no application to trading or monied
corporations where the relation was not personal. This argument, however, did not
meet with the approval of the court, which said, "The fact that it is a business corporation in no wise dispenses with the obligation of all members to assemble together, unless
otherwise provided, for the e:eercise of a right to participate in the election of their
officers." 103 Pa. St. 134 at 138. This bears out what is so aptly said by Chester
Rohrlich: "In the early days, little attention was given to the distinction between public
and private corporations • • . and many inconsistencies in modern corporation law can
be traced to this early confusion." Rohrlich, "Corporate Voting: Majority Control,"
7 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 218 at 225, note 43 (1933).
8 23 Ch. Div. 14 (1882).
.
9 State ex rel. Mc~aig v. Board of Directors of H. F. Dangberg Land & Live

1942]

CORPORATE PROXIES

41

B. Express Charter Authority to Vote by Proxy

In England, clauses expressly authorizing voting by proxy were
being inserted in corporate charters at least as early as the beginning
of the eighteenth century.10 In an act passed in 171 o for the relief of the
creditors and proprietors of the Company of Mine Adventurers, proprietors were given the right to vote by proxy.11 Likewise, when the
Northumberland Fishery Society was organized in 1789, the charter
stated that the members could vote by proxy; proxy holders to be
proprietors.12
A few examples will suffice to show that express clauses permitting
proxy voting were to be found in the charters of companies organized in
the United States in the late 17oo's and early decades of the nineteenth
century. The Illinois-Wabash agreement of 1774 contained specific
permission for the use of proxies at corporate meetings. 13 Proxy voting
was also specifically provided for in the articles of association of the
Ohio Company, organized in 1786.14 The charter of the Bank of Newburg, organized in New York in 1811~ permitted voting by proxy.15
An act to incorporate the Lake Drummond and Orapeake Coal ComStock Co., 60 Nev. 382, 110 P. (2d) 212 (1941); Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L.
222 (1834); Brown v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 209 (1856); Perry v.
Tuskaloosa Cotton-Seed Oil-Mill Co., 93 Ala. 364, 9 So. 217 (1891); McKee v.
Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N. W. 609 (1904). ANGELL and AMES,
CoRPORATIONS 67 (1832): "The right of voting at an election of an incorporated
company by proxy, is not a general right, and the party who claims it must show a
special authority for that purpose." For statements to the same purpose, see 5 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2050 (1931); 2 THOMPSON, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., § 968 (1927); 3 CooK, C9RPORATIONs, 8th ed., § 610, p. 2130
(1923); PALMER, COMPANY LAw, 16th ed., 158 (1938). See also, Williston, "History
of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1880," 2 HARV. L. REv. 105, 149 at 158
(1888). Note, 29 L. R. A. 844 (1896).
10 Du Bois, THE ENGLISH BusINEss CoMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE AcT, 17201800, p. 288 (1938): "Voting by proxy was a usual feature of the eighteenth century
general court [ the term most frequently used in the eighteenth century to designate the
gathering' of the ·proprietors at large], although as a rule the proxy would have to be a
proprietor." And in note 52, p. 317, the same writer points out that "Examples of
express clauses permitting proxy voting were to be found in the charter of the Amicable
Corporation for Perpetual Assurance (Patent Rolls, 5 Anne, part 4, I 706; Carr, Select
Charters, 256), the act of incorporation of the British Society for Extending the
Fisheries and Improving the Sea Coasts of the Kingdom in I 786 ( 26 George III, c.
106)." '
11 9 Anne, c. 24 (1710). For an interesting history of the Company of Mine
Adventurers, see 2 ScoTT, JOINT STOCK COMPANIES To 1720, pp. 443-458 (1910).
12 29 George III, c. 25 (1789).
18 LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES 229 (1939).
uid. 138.
15 N. Y. Laws (18u), c. 69, § 3, p. 123. See also, N. Y. Laws (1814), c. 101,
p. I 15, § 3, "An act to incorporate the North American Coal Company."
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pany was passed in North Carolina in r829. Its charter contained the
following provision in regard to voting, for president and directors:
"and any proprietor by writing, under his or her hand executed before
two witnesses, may depute any other member or proprietor to vote and
act as proxy for him or her at any general meeting." 16 Likewise, the
charter of the Mallary Manufacturing Company, organized in New
Jersey in I 84I, contained a clause permitting the stockholders to vote
either in person or by proxy.11

C. The Theory that the Right to Vote by Proxy may be
Conferred by By-Laws
Inasmuch as many of the early governing statutes and corporate
charters were silent on the subject of proxy voting, stockholders resorted to the use of by-laws to secure the right to cast their votes by
proxy. Since the courts are not agreed on the proposition that the right
to vote by proxy may be obtained through the enactment of by-laws,
unless there is legislative sanction, it is necessary to consider the consequences of these self-help attempts to secure the right to vote by
proxy.
In the Connecticut case of State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor 18 there
was no clause in the act of incorporation empowering the members to
vote by proxy. The General Assembly incorporated the Hartford
Bridge Company and vested it with the power of establishing such
by-)aws as should be necessary for the government of the corporation.
A by-law was enacted authorizing proxy votes. At one of the annual
meetings of the corporation, several stockholders sought to cast their
votes by proxy, but the presiding officer rejected the votes. The court
held that the vote given by the attorney for his principal should have
been received. Ingersoll, J ., writing the opinion said,
". . . How the point would have been determined, had there
been no by-law, it is unnecessary to say. So much, however, I think
may be said, that those incorporated societies, whose object is the
acquisition of property, stand on a different ground as to this ques-:...
N. C. Laws (1829), c. 35, § 2, p. 32.
N. J. Pub. Laws (1840), p. 123, § 3. See also N. J. Pub. Laws (1841), p.
85, § 5, "An act to incorporate the Trenton Insurance Company, in county of Mercer"; N. J. Pub. Laws (1841), p. 105, § 3, "An act to incorporate the Ryerson Iron
Company, in county Passaic"; N. J. Pub. Laws (1841), p. 150, § 2, "An act io
incorporate the Musconetcong Manufacturing Company"; N. J. Pub. Laws (1842), p.
47, § 3, "An act to incorporate the Rockaway Manufacturing Company."
18 5 Day (Conn.) 329 (1812) (quotation from p. 333). Accord: Wilson v.
American Academy of Music, 43 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 86 (1886).
16

17
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tion, from those of every other kind: That is to say, it is not so·
clear, that every vote given in a corporation of the former kind
must be personal, as it is that it must be so, in one of the latter. I
agree most fully, that by the common law, every vote given in a
corporation instituted for the public good, either of the whole
state, or of a particular town or society; must be personally given.
. . . But from the very nature of a monied institution, the mere
owning of shares in the stock of the corporation, seems, of course,
to give a right of voting. But whatever might have been the mode
of reasoning on ·the nature of monied institutions, still, since the
passing of the by-law above mentioned, I am very clear, that the
votes for officers of this corporation, as well as all other votes relative to it, may be given by proxy."
Approval of the doctrine of the above case was expressed in the
case of People ex rel. Chritzman v. Crossley 19 in Illinois. Here, the
charter of the Illinois Masons' Benevolent Society authorized its members to elect its directors at such time and place, and in such manner as
should be specified in the by-laws, and gave the society power to make
such by-laws as were not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the state. A by-law was enacted authorizing its members to vote at all
elections either in person or by proxy. In an election of directors, objection was made to the right to vote by proxy. Upon quo warranto
proceedings against the successful electors, the court upheld the by-law
authorizing proxies. And in commenting on the case of State ex rel.
Kilbourn v. Tudor, the court said, "The rule of the latter case appears
to be one promotive of convenience, and has to recommend it that it
allows members of a private corporation, instituted for merely private
purposes, to regulate their manner of voting in a way to suit their own
sense of convenience and interest."
In the case of Commonwealth v. Detwiller 20 decided in Pennsylvania, it was said:
". . . When the methods of voting are not fixed by general
law, the corporation may make the law for themselves, subject
to the qualification that such laws and regulations as they make
shall not conflict with the laws of the state or of the United States.
The general law did not touch either of the questions now raised,
and for that reason the corporators or stockholders took them up,
and made a law for themselves, covering both subjects. They have
provided that stockholders shall have one vote for each share held
19

20

69 Ill. 195 (1873) (quotation from p. 197).
131 Pa. St. 614 at 634-635, 18 A. 990 (1890).

-
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by them up to ten shares. ·... This is a reasonable regulation....
The same thing may be said in regard to voting by proxy. It was
competent for the members of this association to consider what
was most convenient for themselves, and best calculated to secure
the votes of the shareholders· at the annual elections. Thev had
the power to refuse to receive votes unless offered by the ~oters
in person, but, upon consideration, they decided that votes might
be cast by proxy. This also was a reasonable regulation, uniform in
its application, works no wrong to any shareholder, and conflicts
with no law of the commonwealth. It is therefore a valid and
binding law, made by the shareholders for their own govei::nment."
So, also, the judge writing the opinion in Walker v. Johnson 21 said,
"the great weight of authority in this country sustains the proposition,
that where the charter of a trading corporation is silent upon this question, th~ power is implied to enact a by-law conferring the right to vote
by proxy." Likewise, Chancellor Walworth of New York in the case
of Philips v. Wickham 22 expressed the opinion that the right to vote
by proxy might be conferred by by-laws. In this case the Chancellor
said, "And it is possible that it might be delegated in some cases by the
by-laws of a corporation, where express authority was given to make
such by-laws, regulating the manner-of voting. I am not aware of any
other case in which the right was ever claimed. . . ." That the right
to vote by proxy may be conferred by means of by-laws is not questioned in the case of Market Street Ry. v. Hellman.28 There the court
said, "That the right of voting by proxy may be conferred through a
by-law adopted by the majority appears to be reasonably settled." And
most writers on the subject of corporation law who have expressed an
opinion on the proposition state that the right to vote by proxy may be
conferred by by-laws, even in the absence o-f statutory provisions for
the enacting of such by-laws.24
17 D. C. App. 144 at 163 (1900).
1 Paige (N. Y.) 590 at 598 (1829).
28 109 Cal. 571 at 598, 42 P. 225 (1895). See Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1902) II6 F. 785.
24 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 2051 (1931), states:
"By the weight of authority, a by-law may be adopted by sufficient vote of the stockholders, so as to allow voting by proxy, instead of in person, as at common law, and it
has been held that a long-continued custom permitting voting in that manner will have
the force and effect of a by-law until regularly revoked." Accord: TAYLOR, PRIVATE
CoRPORATIONs, 5th ed., § 579, p. 588 (1902); I SPELLING, PRIVATE CoRPORATioNs,
§ 387, p. 420 (1892); 3 CooK, CoRPORATIONs, 8th ed., § 610, p. 2130 (1923).
In 2 KENT, CoMMENTARIEs, 14th ed., 295 (1896), it is stated, "Though in the case
of elections in public and municipal corporations, and in all ot_her elections of a public
21
22
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In the New Jersey case of Taylor v. Griswold,25 a contrary rule is
laid down. There, the charter of the Passaic and Hackensack Bridge
Company contained a general clause authorizing the company to make
such by-laws as they might deem necessary for the government of the
institution. A by-law, which had been passed prior to the incorporation
of the bridge company, declared "that each stockholder shall have as
many votes as he has shares, by himself, or by proxy." The petitioner
sought to set aside an election held by the stockholders of the company because the tellers had refused to receive votes tendered by proxy.
The petition was denied. In holding that legislative sanction was necessary before a corporation could make a by-law authorizing members to
vote by proxy, the court said,
" ... the right of voting by proxy in this case, is claimed under
existing by-laws, or the usage and practice of the •company. The
validity of this claim depends upon the answer which must be
given to another question, namely: Whether the corporation,
either incidentally, or in virtue of anything contained in the charter, has a right to make such a by-law, or to adopt such usage? Let
us then inquire, first, is the right to make such a by-law, one of the
natural and incidental powers of a corporation? When the crown
creates a corporation, it grants to it, by implication, all powers that
are necessary for carrying into effect the object for which it was
created. . . . we repeat the question whether the right to make a
by-law, dispensing with the personal attendance of members, and
permitting them to appear and vote by proxy, is incidental to a
corporation, the answer must be in the negative. . .. If one member may appear and vote by proxy at elections, and on other matnature, every vote must be personally given; yet in the case of moneyed corporations,
instituted for private purposes, it has been held that the right of voting by proxy might
be delegated by the by-laws of the institution when the charter was silent." In support
of this Chancellor Kent cites State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day (Conn.) 329
(1812).
25 14 N. J. L. 222 (1834) (quotation from pp. 227, 228, 229). The decision of
the Supreme Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Id. 253, note. Chancellor Kent,
in a footnote in connection with the materials above quoted, supra note 24, said, "And
in Taylor Griswold •.. in the Supreme Court of New Jersey •.. it was held to be a
principle of the common law that, where an election depended upon the exercise of
judgment, the right could not be deputed; and that it required legislative sanction,
before any corporate body could make a valid by-law authorizing members to vote by
proxy. The authority of the case of The State v. Tudor, may, therefore, be considered
as essentially shaken." 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 14th ed., 295, note a (1896). See
also, Williston, "History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1880," 2 HARV.
L. REv. 105, 149 at 158 (1888); "Contrary to what is now generally held, it is very
doubtful if the authority of a by-law would have been held in the last century sufficient
to confer the right."

v.
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ters of vital importance to the institution, then all may, and so the
welfare and interest of the company and of the public, be utterly
neglected. In short, so far from its being incident to a corporation,
to lll:ake such a regulation, it is at variance with the spirit, and 'with
the fundamental principles of our civil and political institutions.' "
In view ~f the foregoing authorities, it would seem that the authority of a by-law, even in the absence pf legislative sanction, would have
been sufficient to confer the right to vote by proxy. For a period of at
least fifty years prior to the time of the decision in Taylor v. Griswold,
corporations had been known to permit absent stockholders to cast ~heir
votes at corporate meetings by proxy.26 Therefore, since the Passaic
and Hackensack Bridge Company was a business or monied corporation,
and not organized for religious, charitable, or, municipal purposes, and
since voting at corporate meetings by proxy was not unknown, it would
appear that the New Jersey Supreme Court was not justified in holding
that, in the absence of legislative sanction, the right to vote by proxy
could not be conferred by a by-law. Inasmuch, however, as every state
but two now have statutes authorizing stockholders to cast their votes
by proxy,21 the question of securing the power to vote by proxy through
a by-law, in the absence of legislative sanction, is only of historical
interest.

D. Authority to Vote by Proxy Conferred by General
Incorporation Statutes
It is too well known for additional comment that during the latter
part of the eighteenth and early part of th~ nineteenth centuries, the
method of incorporating companies was by means• of spedal legislation.
' 26 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS ~N THE EARLIEJl HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 125,
note 2 ( l 917): "The minutes show that fifty-seven subscribers were 'present in proper
person' and thirty-four by proxy." This refers to the ll).inutes of a stockholders' meeting
of the Potomac Company, organized in Maryland in 1784, and in Virginia the following year. Again, p. 163, "The ,stockholders met September II (1792], agreed
upon plans for construction, decided as well that the books should be reopened during
November and December' to secure the full one thousand shares, and in view of the
small attendance at this meeting voted henceforth to allow proxies." This is a quotation
from the minutes of a stockholders' meeting of the Western Company, a corporation
organized in New York to develop inland lock navigation in the state of New York.
27 Iowa and Texas. In Iowa such a right may be given in the charter, articles of
incorporation or by-laws of the corporation. See, McKee v. Home Savings & Trust
Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N. W. 609 (1904). By universal custom stockholders in Texas
corporations have been permitted to vote by proxy from a very early date. Although
Texas has no statute permitting stockholders to vote by proxy where the corporation is
organized under the Texas general incqrporation statute, the courts probably will hold
that _stockholders can vote by proxy because that is the universal custom in that state.
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In I 8 I I the state of New York adopted a statute providing for the
first general legislation for the formation of certain types of business
corporations.28 This statute, which authorized any group complying
with its terms to form a manufacturing corporation, contained the following provisions in regard to voting by proxy:
"And be it further enacted, That the stock, property and concern;, of such company shall be managed and conducted by trustees,
who except those for the first year, shall be elected at such time and
· place as shall be directed by the by-laws of said company ... and
the election shall be made by such of the stockholders as shall
attend for that purpose, either in person or by proxy...."
Again, in 1827 New York adopted a statute providing for the formation and regulation of monied corporations.29 Possibly hoping to
prevent voting at stockholders' meetings by fraudulent proxies, this
statute contained more stringent rules as to the casting of votes by
proxies. It was there provided:
"No person shall be permitted to vote upon any proxy of a
stockholder, unless he shall produce, annexed to his proxy, an
affidavit of such stockholder, stating the same facts to which the
oath of such stockholder might have been required, upon a challenge, had he offered the vote in person, on the shares mentioned
in the proxy." so
The state of Maryland, in I 838, adopted an act prescribing general regulations for the incorporation of manufacturing and mining
companies. Among other things, the act provided that "the stockholders
shall be entitled to one vote, for every share owned by them respectively, up to the number of fifteen, inclusive . . . and may vote in
person or by proxy." 81
The New Hampshire case of Bowditch v. Jackson Co. 82 gives an
excellent review of proxy legislation in that state.
" ... It is not necessary to now consider what effect the act of
842, forbidding all proxy voting ..• had upon this right. . ..
The act of I 842 was repealed four years later, and the principle
I

28

N. Y. Laws {1811), c. 67, p. I I 1, esp.§ 3.
N.Y. Laws (1827), c. 18, tit. 2.
80
Id., § 40, p. 445•
31
Md. Laws {1838), c. 267; § 5·
82
76 N. H. 351 at 360, 82 A. 1014 (1912). The acts referred to are N. H.
Rev. Stat. {1842), c. 146, § 20; N. H. Laws {1846), c. 321, § 5; N. H. Gen. Stat.
{1867), c. 134, § 21; N. H. Laws (1901), c. 68.
29
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of general proxy voting was adopted. . . . The limitation of the
right, incorporated in the revision of 1867 . . . was removed in
1901; so that now a proxy can represent more than one stockholder, and one stockholder can be proxy for another."
The origin and development of legislative sanction for proxy voting
in New Jersey is succinctly stated by Dixon, J., in the case of Warren
v. Pim: 88
"In 1841 the legislature authorized stockholders in all incorporated companies whose charters did not otherwise provide, to
vote by proxy at all the elections of directors, if the vote was
tendered not more than three years after the date of the proxy....
"In 1846 ... it was enacted, with regard to manufacturing companies, that at all me~tings of the company absent stockholders
might vote by proxy, authorized in writing.... These provisions
were in 1 849 . . . extended to some other sorts of corporations.
"In the revision of our Corporation Acts, adopted April 7th,
1875, these enactments of 1841 and 1846 were made applicable
to all companies organized under 'the laws of this state...."
Of all the early legislation conferring the power on stockholders
'to vote by proxy, the most considerate attitude was shown by the
Pennsylvania legislature. In an act se1 passed in I 849 "to encourage
manufacturing operations in this commonwealth," the legislature provided,
" ... and the election shall be made by such of the stockholders
as shall attend, either in person or by proxy; All elections shall be
by ballot ... no stockholder, females excepted,85 residing within
ten miles of the place appointed for such general meeting or
election, shall vote by proxy, nor shall any person vote as proxy
for more than two absent stockholders."
In England, the first general legislation providing for the organization of companies took the form of the "Companies Clauses Consolidation Act," 86 wherein it was declared that "every shareholder shall
have one vote for every share up to ten ... and the votes may be given
either personally or by proxies being shareholders authorized by
writing."
88 66 N. J. Eq. 353 at 357-358, 59 A. 773 (1904). The statutes referred to are
N. ]. Pub. Laws (1841), p. u6, § 2; N. J. Pub. Laws (1846), p. 64; N. J. Pub.
Laws (1849), p. 300, §§ II, 37; N. J. Gen. Stat. (1875), p. 907, §§ 21, 38, 39.
84 Pa. Laws (1849), No. 368, p. 563, § 4•
85 Writer's own italics.
86 8 & 9 Viet., c. 16, § 75 (1845). Schedule F provided for the following form of
proxy:
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II
RIGHT TO VoTE BY PROXY-REGULATION BY BY-LAW

It is within the power of a corporation to determine by its by-laws
the method of voting by proxy. 37 But by-laws regulating the use of
proxies must not unduly limit or restrict the statutory power conferred.
Where the by-law unduly restricts or alters the voting power of stock
of a corporation as established by statute or charter, the by-law is of
course void. 38
However, by-laws may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to vote by proxy. A by-law may regulate filing of
proxies, presentation, mode of voting and other purely formal matters.89 Likewise, the by-laws may provide that proxies shall be filed
a certain time before the meeting of the shareholders.40 So too, they
may provide that the proxies be witnessed. 41 It has also been indicated
by one court that a by-law requiring new proxies to be executed for
each election a reasonable time before holding the same would not
constitute unreasonableness or oppression, although it might prove
inconvenient.42
In a number of cases the courts have found the restrictions void as
unreasonable and depriving the stockholders of substantial rights conferred upon them by the charter or general statutory law. Thus, a bylaw that no person should be permitted to vote more than eight shares
by proxy was held invalid.43 A resolution in the nature of an amendment of the by-laws which provided that no proxies should be voted
at the meeting which were not datS!d prior to the first of the month,
and that no officer of the corporation should act as proxy holder for a
"A. B., - - - , one of the proprietors of 'The _ _ _ Company,' doth hereby
appoint C. D., of _ __, to be the proxy of the said A. B. in his absence to vote in
his name upon any matter relating to the undertaking proposed at the meeting of the
proprietors of the said company, to be held on the _ _ day of _ _ in such manner
as he the said C. D. doth think proper. In witness whereof the said A. B. hath hereunto
set his hand ( or if a corporation say the common seal of the corporation), the _ _ day
of _ _ one thousand eight hundred and - - · "
87 2 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs, 3d ed.,§ 971 (1927).
88 Clark v. Wild, 86 Vt. 212, 81 A. 536 (1911); Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards,
26 Del. 1, 79 A. 790 (1911); State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67
N. E. 207 (1903); Commonwealth ex rel. J. H. Grier v. Coxe, l Leg. Chron. (Pa.)
89 (1873).
39 People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 104 Cal.
649, 38 P. 452 (1894); Walker v. Johnson, 17 D. C. App. 144 (1900).
40 Shaw v. Tati Concessions, Ltd., [1913] I Ch. 292.
41 Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch.
14 (1882).
42 Walker v. Johnson, 17 D. C. App. 144 (1900).
43 People ex rel. Snapp v. Younger, 238 Ill. App. 502 (1925).
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stockholder, was held to be void, where the by-laws of the corporation
permitted voting by proxy without any such limitation.44 And where
a statute authorized the stockholders to be repr~ented at all elections
by proxy holders of their own selection, a by-law providing that no
proxy should be voted by any one not a stockholder of the corporation
was adjudged void. 45 Likewise, where in pursuance of a power granted
by statute,· action was taken by the board of trustees of an insurance
company in the nature of a resolution that the officers of the company
be authorized to vote proxies held by them at the annual meeting of
the shareholders, but limited that authority to thirteen special matters,
the court held such restriction invalid and that authority was conferred
generally by the board's resolution. 46 It has also been held that neither
the stockholder nor the proxy holder can be compelled by a by-law to
take an oath that the former is the owner of the stock.47
Several jurisdictions have recognized that long-continued custom
permitting voting by .proxy will have the effect of a by-law until regularly revoked. 48

III
WHo MAY

AcT As

PROXY HoLDER

Unless·the statute,4° articles of incorporation or by-laws 50 require
it, it is not essential that the person who is appointed to act as proxy
holder should himself be a stockholder; 51 he may be an entire stranger
to the corporation. And where the statute, charter, or articles of incorporation confer the right to vote by proxy without limitation as to the
person who may represent the stockholder, any by-law attempting to
-

Walker v. Johnson, 17 D. C. App. 144 (1900).
45 In re Lighthall Mfg: Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 258 (1888); People's Home Savings Ban~ v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 104 Cal. 649, 38 P. 4 52 ( l 894). See
infra, title III.
46 State ex rel. Lally v. Cadigan, 103 Wash. 254, 174 P. 965 (1918).
47 People v. Tibbets, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 358 (1825); People v. Kip, 4 Cow. (N. Y.)
382 (1822). These decisions would seem to be questionable ones in so far as they
enunciate a general principle, for such a regulation does not seem to be either unreasonable or necessarily in conflict with the statutory direction.
48 Walker v. Johnson, 17 D. C. App. 144 (1900); Rossing v. State Bank of Bode,
181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917); In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, (C. C. A.
2d, 1922) 280 F. 638; Mo!].sseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Ann. 482 (1867).
49 Obviously, a by-law which purports to restrict the right to vote by proxy conferred by statute is void.
50 Supra, p. 49.
51 Gentry-Futch v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925); In re Lighthall
Mfg. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 258 (1888); People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior
Court of San Francisco, 104 Cal. 649, 38 P. 452 (1894) ;· Babcock v. Chicago Rys.,
325 Ill. 16, 155 N. E. 773 (1927).
44
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limit the stockholder's right in this respect is void. 52 One stockholder
may act as the proxy holder for another stockholder,58 and directors
and other officers of the corporation may act as proxy holders unless
there is something in the statute or charter which forbids or renders it
impossible. 54 The same person may act as proxy holder for the owners
of the majority of the stock,5 5 or for the owners of all the stock. Even
though a person is permitted to vote only a certain number of shares
owned by him, he is still qualified to act as proxy holder for another
stockholder.56 A corporation may designate its secretary as its proxy
holder to vote stock owned in another corporation.57
While wide range is .given to the stockholder in his appointment of
a person to represent him as his proxy holder, there are limitations to
be found. For example, the National Bank Act 58 provides that no
officer, clerk, teller or bookkeeper of such bank shall act as proxy holder.
And it has been held contempt of court for directors to use a "strawman" as their proxy holder in attempting to obtain voluntary liquidation of a company, where a petition had already been lodged by a
creditor of the company asking that the company might be wound up
by the court.59
52 In re Lighthall Mfg. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 258 {1888); People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 104 Cal. 649, 38 P. 452 (1894); People
ex rel. Snapp v. Younger, 238 Ill. App. 502 (1925); State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson,
31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N. E. 207 ( I 903); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS,
perm. ed., § 2050 (1931). Fear of placing additional control in the hands of the
management of the corporation, if by-laws could be adopted limiting the class of persons
who might be appointed to act as proxy holders, was apparently one of the original
justifications for holding by-laws, containing such limitations, void. Thus, in People's
Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court of San Francisco, supra, wherein a by-law
adopted by the bank providing that no proxy could be voted by one not a stockholder
of the corporation was held to be without the power of the corporation, the court said,
"If you may limit by by-law the right of holding a proxy to stockholders, you may
limit it to directors, or the president, or the secretary, and thus the interests in control
would have the power to compel the minority interests, if unable to be present in person,
to be represented by the very interests to which they are opposed, and- to reinstate
in office the very men whose election they desire to defeat." 104 Cal. 649 at 652-653.
58 Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 82 A. 1014 (1912).
H State v. Meredith, 183 Iowa 783, 167 N. W. 626 (1918); Woodruff v.
Dubuque & S. C.R. R., (C. C. N. Y. 1887), 30 F. 91.
55 Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 82 A. 1014 (1912); Venner v.
Chicago City Ry., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949 (1913); Smith v. San Francisco &
N. P. Ry., n5 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897); Babcock v. Chicago Rys., 325 Ill. 16,
155 N. E. 773 (1927).
56 Conant v. Millaudon, 5 La. Ann. 542 (1850).
57 Market Street Ry. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 P. 225 {1895).
58 12 U.S. C. (1941), § 61; Bridgers v. First Nat. Bank, 152 N. C. 293, 67
S. E. 770 (1910).
59 In re Septirnus Parsonage & Co., [ I 90 I] 2 Ch. 424.
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IV
FoRM OF PROXY

It is almost universally agreed that a proxy may be informal.
Furthermore, no particular form of words is necessary to constitute
a proxy. 60 The instrument, however, should show an intention on the
part of the shareholder to empower ·the person to whom it is given to
act in voting the stock, and that it is free from all reasonable grounds
of suspicion of its genuineness and authenticity.61 The essential thing
is that an agency to vote the stock be created; the instrument called
the proxy is merely evidence of the relation.62..It seems only reasonable
that the instrument intended as a proxy should be liberally construed
so it will confer the power manifestly intended; 68 otherwise the use
of proxies would be hedged about by almost prohibitive restrictions and
would sacrifice practicability to mere form. 64
·
Some formal requirements, however, are necessary. Although there
is some authority that an oral proxy is valid,65 a proxy, for all practical
purposes, should be in writing. 66 In the first place, there is no sure or
satisfactory method by which the inspectors of elections may determine ·
the authenticity of oral proxies.. Furthermore, an oral proxy is unsuitable for use because of the difficulty of proof of the scope of authority
confei:red, and the impossibility of conforming to regulations designed
~ 0 Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry., II5 Cal. 584,.47 P. 582 (1897); GentryFutch v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925).
61 ln re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
62 Duffy v. Loft, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 140, 151 A. 223 (1930), affd. 17 Del. Ch.
376, 152 A. 849 (1930).
63 Smith v. San Francisco & N. P.. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897); Gow v.
Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933). But cf.
Marie v. Garrison, 1.3 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 210 (1883). That a liberal construction
is justified seems logical, since strict legal requirements would undoubtedly impair the
use of proxies and thus defeat the purpose for which they were created. Then, too,
"A stockholder desiring to give an associate his proxy, could hardly be expected to
obtain the services of a lawyer that the instrument might be drafted with all legal
formality and requirements." 2 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs, 3d ed., § 972 (1927). •
64 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933). A statute which permitted stock to be voted by proxy and prescribed that the
proxies be "duly filed" was interpreted as being merely directory. Farwell v. Houghton
Copper Works, (C. C. Mich. 1881) 8 F. 66.
65 Hoene v. Pollak, II8 Ala. 617, 24 So. 349 (1897). This case was decided on
the basis of an Alabama statute authorizing personal property owned by the wife to be
disposed of by the husband and wife by parol.
66 "A proxy should be in writing...•" 3 CooK, CoRPORATIONs, 8th ed., § 610,
p. 2134 (1923). "An oral proxy seems almost inconceivable." 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2057, p. 179, note 47 (1931).
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for written proxies. 67 In recent years proxies by telegram and cablegram have been frequently used. Inasmuch as it has been held that a
telegram satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds for a writing
signed or subscribed by the person to be charged therewith, 68 and since
a telegram also satisfies the requirements of the Negotiable Instruments Law that "the acceptance must be in writing and signed by the
drawee," 69 it should certainly satisfy a statute requiring a proxy to be
in writing. 10
An undated proxy is valid, and inspectors of elections are not
justified in refusing proxies merely because blanks are left in them
for the day and month of their execution. 71 However, if a statute
67 Twenty-four jurisdictions have statutes prescribing that proxies be in writing.
Eighteen of the twenty-four merely require the proxies to be in writing; the other
six require both writing and filing with the secretary of the corporation.
Proxies must be in writing in the following jurisdictions: Ark. Stat. Dig. (Pope,
1937), § 2189; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 3405; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (1927),
§ 6553; Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1941), § 22-1863; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith Hurd,
1935), § 157.28; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1933), § 25-207 (e) (3); Ky. Stat. (Carroll,
1930), § 551; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929), § 1628; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:rn-9;
N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929), tit. 22, Gen. Corp. Law, § 19; N. C. Code
(1935), § u73; Ohio Gen. Code, (Page, 1938), § 8623-53; Okla. Stat. (1941), tit.
18, § 121; Ore. Comp. Laws (1940), § 77-216; S. C. Civil Code (1932), § 7679;
S. D. Code (1939), § 11.0711; Tenn. Code (1938), § 3740; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933),
§ 5812.
In the following jurisdictions proxies must be in writing and filed with the secretary of the corporation: Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 321; Idaho Code Ann. (1932),
§ 29-133 (3); La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939), § III2; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
1940), § 7492-25 (IV); Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1938), tit. 15, § 2852-504; Wash. Rev.
Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28.
68 Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880); Littlev. Dougherty, II Colo. 103, 17
P. 292 (1888); Kingfisher Mill & Elevator Co. v. Westbrook, 79 Okla. 188, 192 P.
209 (1920).
69 Commercial Bank of Woodville v. First Nat. Bank of Morgan City, 147 La.
925, 86 So. 342 (1920); Selma Sav. Bank v. Webster County Bank, 182 Ky. 604,
206 S. W. 870 (1918).
70 See, Ohio Gen. Code, (Page, 1938), § 8623-53, wherein it is provided "A
telegram, cablegram, wireless message, or photogram appearing to have been transmitted by a shareholder, or a photograph, a photostatic or equivalent reproduction of a
writing appointing a proxy or proxies shall be sufficient writing." Telegraphic proxies
have also been recognized by the English courts. See In re English, Scottish, and
Australian Chartered Bank, [1893] 3 Ch. 385. See also, Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933) (intimation that telegraphic
proxies are valid).
·
71 In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882); Commissioner of
Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N. E. 609 (1926); In re
Townshend, 64 Hun 636, 18 N. Y. S. 905 (1892); Sadgrove v. Bryden, [ 1907] I
Ch. 3 I 8. As a practical matter, there probably are few proxies presented to a meeting .
which are undated, since many proxy holders will fill in the date if the stockholders
have not done so. The problem as to the date of execution is much simplified when
return post card proxies are used. It would seem that the date of postmarking pre-
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prescribes that no proxy shall be accepted which is dated more than
a specified time 72 before the meeting at which it is offered, the date of
execution would as a practical matter seem desirable. Likewise, if a
statute requires that a proxy be for a specified meeting only,78 the date
of the meeting should be placed on the proxy, although authority from
the shareholder issuing the proxy might be implied to fill in the blank
so as to effectuate the grant of power.74 Many states have statutes which
restrict the validity of proxies to a specified period of time after execution, 75 unless the shareholder executing the proxy specifies therein the
length of time for which the proxy is to continue in force. Although a
date may not be necessary to the validity of a ·proxy in jurisdictions
having such statutory provisions, the date of execution would seem desirable froi;n the standpoint of practical usefulness, since, if contested,
proof would have to be given as to the date of execution. Also, if a
statute prescribes that no proxy shall be valid after the expiration of a
specified time from the date of its execution, unless the shareholder
executing it specifies therein the length of time for which the proxy is
,to continue in force, information must be incorporated into the proxy
indicating the length of time the proxy is to remain operative.
sumably would be the date of execution. The date of postmarking acquires additional
significance where there are two undated and conflicting proxies of t.ne same stockholder presented to the stockholders' meeting.
72 Six months before the meeting: Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 56, § 26; Mass.
'
Gen. ILaws
(1932), c. 156, § 32; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 225, § 64. Three
months before the meeting at which it is offered: Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art.
23, § 23.
73 Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 56, § 26; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 156, § 32;
N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 225, § 64.
74 In re 'Cecil, 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 477 (1869); In re St. Lawrence Steamboat
Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882); Ex parte Duce, 13 Ch. D. 429 (1879); Sadgrove v.
Bryden, [ l 907] I Ch. 3 I 8.
.
·
75 In the following states statutes curtail the duration of the validity of proxies to
eleven months from the date of execution unless the shareholder executing the proxies
specifies therein the length of time such proxies are to continue in force: Cal. Civ. Code
(1941), § 321; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 3405; Idaho Code Ann. (1932), § 29133 (3); Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), § 157.28; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1933),
§ 25-207(e) (3); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1929), § 1112; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
1940), § 7492-25 (IV); N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929), tit. 22, Gen. Corp.
Law, § 19; Ohio Gen. Code, (Page, 1938), § 8623-53; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1938),
§ 2852-504; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28.
The maximum statutory validity of proxies varies in different jurisdictions from
three to seven years: Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 321, 7 years; N. M. Stat. Ann. (1929),
.§ 32-142, 5 years; Ida1lo Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133(3), 3 years; Kan. Gen. Stat.
(Supp. 1941), § 17-3301, 3 years; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-12, 3 years;
N. C. Code (1935), § 1173, 3 years; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1938), tit. 15, § 2852-504,
3 years; Porto Rico Laws (1911), No. 30, § 22, p. 98, 3 years; Wash. Rev. Stat.
(Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28, 3 years; W. Va. Code (1937), § 3079, 3 years.
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A proxy need not be witnessed,76 acknowledged or proved,11 and
unless contested, it is not necessary to introduce evidence to show
proxies wer.e properly executed.78 The presence of a seal,7° or of required revenue stamps is not necessary to the validity of a proxy.80
Neither do uncancelled revenue stamps make a proxy invalid.81 Where
there is a misdescription of the corporation designated in the proxy, but
it is evident what was intended, the inspectors of the corporate election
may not reject the proxy merely because of the misdescription.82 Nor
can a stockholder ·object, if not misled by the description. 88 It is adequate if a person is described in a proxy; he need not be named.84 And
where a proxy is signed in blank and delivered, the proxy holder has,
under general agency principles, the power to fill up the blank with
his own name,85 thus effectuating the grant of authority. Likewise,
where proxies are delivered with day and month left blank, the person
to whom they are delivered is authorized under the circumstances to
fill in the blanks. 86 Votes cast by proxy holders may be counted even
ln re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 477 (1869).
Id.; In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
78 Stevens v. Emergency Hospital of Easton, 142 Md. 526, 121 A. 475 (1923).
79 State ex rel. Hankins v. Newell, 75 N. J. L. 26 (1907).
8 °Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N. E.
609· (1926); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N. Y. S. 61 (1925); State
ex rel. Hemmy v. Miller, 173 Wis. 412, 181 N. W. 745 (1921), setting aside former
judgment 173 Wis. 412, 179 N. W. 815 (1920), on authority of Cole v. Ralph,
252 U.S. 286, 40 S. Ct. 321 (1920).
81 Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 2n N. Y. S. 61 (1925).
82 Langan v. Francklyn, 29 Abb. N. Cas. 102, 20 N. Y. S. 404 (1892).
88 Langan v. Francklyn, 29 Abb. N. Cas. 102, 20 N. Y. S. 404 (1892). The
notice of the meeting of the stockholders and the proxies referred to a special meeting
of the shareholders of the "Union Gaslight Company of East New York." The correct
name of the company was the "Union Gaslight Company."
84 Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp. v. Dorabji Cursetji Shroff, [1905] App. Cas.
213. The articles of association of the Indian Zoedone Company stated "All appointments of proxies shall be in the form or to the effect following (that is to say), I, the
undersigned ____ one of the members of the Indian Zoedone Company, Limited,
do hereby appoint ____ to be my proxy." In the proxy that was given, the Indian
Zoedone Company was described as a proprietor instead as a member. The court held
that the proxy was to the effect required and was not invalid because it varied from the
form prescribed merely by describing the company giving the proxy as a proprietor
instead as a member. In re Indian Zoedone Co., 26 Ch. D. 70 (1884).
85 Ex parte Duce, 13 Ch. D. 429 (1879). In this case Lord Justice James said, "If
a man will sign a proxy in blank, it is his own fault; he should be careful not to do
so.••• People should take care not to part with blank proxies." It was held in Haslam
v. Carlson, 46 R. I. 53, 124 A. 734 (1924), that while a ballot cast by one claiming
authority to do so when such authority does not appear on the face of the instrument
is an invalid ballot, yet it is an invalidity which the stockholders meeting, before the
vote was declared, might have permitted the proxy holder to correct.
86 Ernest v. Loma Gold Mines, [1896] 2 Ch. 572, affd. [1897] 1 Ch. 1.
76
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though they fail to note the number of shares voted on their ballots in
the place provided for such notation. 87
V
THE EXECUTION OF PROXIES

A. In General
In this section the situation is varied from that of the preceding
one in th~t the emphasis is put upon the formalities of execution and
proper signing of proxies. It should be kept in mind that the following material consists of practical recommendations as well as legal
actualities. Two matters are interwoven in the discussion: advice to
shareholders as to the proper form of signing, and suggestions to the
inspectors of elections as to acceptance of proxies.
It is recommended that proxies be legibly signed in ink, and that
the signature conform exactly with the name of the shareholder as it
appears. on the stock records of the corporation. A federal court evidenced a tendency in Schilling v. Car Lighting & Power Co. 88 to be
very rigid in the formal requirements as to the place on the proxy the
signature of the shareholder should appear. In that case the shareholder
signed his name in the body of the instrument and not at the foot
thereof, the grant of power following rather than preceding the signature. The court held that the proxy was void since not signed at the
end of the proxy. The view taken by the court seems clearly erroneous,
for the eyident intent of the shareholder to grant the power was manifest from the instrument. 89 Other than that the shareh.older must sign
the instrument for the purpose of authenticating the grant of power,
it should be immaterial that the signature forms part of the body of
writing, instead of being written at the foot or end thereof. 90 The use
87 Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.; 46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N. E. 514
(1932). In the blank space on the ballot for noting the number of shares the proxy
committee noted "All shareholders per list and proxies submitted."
88 (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 289 F. 489.
89 The proxies sent to stockholders were in the following form, reciting: "Know
all men by these presents that I ___ the undersigned... '." Then follows the delegation of power, concluding with these words: "In witness whereof, 1 have hereunto
set my hand and seal this _ _ day of - - , I 922. In presence of."
90 The maker's or drawer's signature to a bill of exchange or promissory note need
be in no particular place on the instrument, Donohoe's Estate, 271 Pa. 554, 115 A.
878 ( 1922). A federal court sustained notes in which the maker signed above a line
designating the place of payment. Turnbull v. Thomas, (C. C. Va. 1875) I Hughes
172, F. Cas. No. 14,243. Most states do not require that a will be signed at the end.
The writing of the testator's name anywhere on the instrument is sufficient if he intended it to operate as his signature. ATKINSON, WILLS 255 (1937).
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of an initial instead of spelling out of the Christian name is not enough
to require the inspectors to reject the proxy.91
B. Partnership Proxies

Where stock is registered in the name of a brokerage firm, the
proxy may be signed in the firm name in the same form as appears on
the stock records of the corporation.92 The recommended form of signature of a proxy to vote stock owned by a partnership is: "X, Y, & Co.,
by AX, a partner." Thus, in Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corporation,98 the proxy was signed in longhand in the partnership name
of the registered owner. The signature of the firm did not show that
it was by one of the individual partners. 04 The Chancellor held that
the proxies should have been recognized and said,
" ... The practical considerations of business suggest that if a
proxy is signed in the name of a partnership which is the registered
holder of the stock, and the only criticism of it is that it was !].either
signed by all the members of the firm nor by one who affixes his
own name as the representative of all, it nevertheless is entitled to
be taken as presumptively genuine." 95
C. Corporations
Where stock is registered in the name of a corporation, the traditional form is to have the proxy signed in the corporate name by the
president or vice-president of such corporation and its corporate seal
affixed and attested by its secretary or an assistant secretary.96 In Gow
v. Consolidated Coppermines Corporation 97 the Chancellor indicated
that the execution of corporation proxies need not be attended with all
the formalities required for the execution of solemn corporate acts. In
effect, the Chancellor held that such a proxy is valid if signed merely
91

743·

92

Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d)

Many corporations use proxies which have a space wherein the exact stock
record name is stenciled in before the proxy is mailed. In such cases, the records themselves are usually not examined in checking proxies, reliance being had on the stenciled or addressographed name.
98
19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933).
94
As a matter of fact the partnerships were firms of brokers.
95
r9 Del. Ch. 172 at 201-202. Inspectors act properly in recognizing a proxy
signed by one of two joint owners. Sellers v. Joseph Brancroft & Sons Co., (Del. Ch. •
1941) 17 A. (2d) 831.
91!
A. B. Corporation
by John Doe, President
(Corporate Seal)
Attest: Henry Roe, Secretary.
97
19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933).
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"AB Corporation." The Chancellor also said that, assuming that some
of the proxies signed "and Co." after a name or names were from corporations, such proxies were valid. It seems, therefore, that a proxy
to vote stock of record in the name of a corporation is valid if signed
in either of the two ways indicated or in any other way intermediate
between the two methods.

D. Agents and Attorneys-in-Fact
Where the stock is registered in the name of an agent or attorneyin-fact 08 the proxy should be signed in the same form as appears on the
stock record book. If the stock is registered in the name of the principal
( as for example, "XY") for whom the person signing the proxy acts
as agent or attorney-in-fact, the signature to the proxy should be in
the form "XY, by AB, Attorney-in-fact," and proof of AB's authority
to execute the proxy,9° if available, should accompany the proxy.

E. Executors and Administrators
Here, again, the proxy should be signed by the executor or administrator in the same form as appears on the list of shareholders.100
The inspectors of elections, however, are not justified in rejecting
proxies signed by only one of two executors.101 Where the person in·
whose name the stock is registered is deceased and the stock has not
been transfe,;-red into the name of his executor or administrator, evidence of the authority of his executor or administrator to sign a proxy
should accompany the proxy.102 It has been held that a proxy signed
by the .heirs and next of kin of a decedent rather than by his executor or
administrator is void as to shares owned by the decedent.103
98
99

As, for example, "AB, attorney for )['{."
For instance, a letter from )['{ or a copy of the power of attorney given by him

to AB.
100 It is a common practice to register stock in the following manner: "John
Doe and B Bank, Executors, o/o B Bank." In such cases, and, indeed, in almost every
case where a bank is one of the trustees, it is the general business practice to accept a
proxy signed only by the bank.
101 Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., (Del. Ch. 194 I ) I 7 A. ( 2d) 8 3 I.
Accord: ~tterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d)

·743.
102 Such evidence is generally in the form of a certificate of the appointment of
such executor or administrator signed ·by a judge, clerk or other proper officer of the
court which appointed him. The proxy should be signed in the form "AB, Executor
under the Will of )['{," or "AB, Administrator of the Estate of )['{.''
103 Schoharie Valley R. R. Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 394 (1872).
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F. Guardians
The proxy should be signed by the guardian in the same form as
appears on the stock records of the corporation. If ,a person signing a
proxy signs as guardian for the person in whose name the stock is registered, the signature should be in the form "AB, Guardian for XY,"
and the evidence of AB's authority to execute the proxy should ;ccompany the proxy,1°4 if such authority is available.

G. Joint Tenants and Tenants in Common
Where stock is registered in the names of two or more persons as
joint tenants and one of such persons is deceased, the proxy should
be signed by the survivor, as, for example, "X, Surviving Joint Tenant," and, if available, evidence of the death of the other tenant should
accompany the proxy. In case the stock is registered in the names
of two or more persons as tenants in common and one of such persons
is deceased, the proxy should be signed by the survivor or survivors and
by the executor or administrator of the decedent.

·H. Trustees
Where stock is registered in the name of a trustee, as, for example,
"AB, Trustee" or "AB, Trustee for XY," the proxy should be signed
by the trustee in the same manner as appears on the stock records of the
corporation. If there are two or more trustees, all should sign the
proxy,105 unless the solicitor is informed that iess than all have authority
to sign for all, in which case the form of signature should be:
AB, CD and EF, Trustees
by AB (or AB and CD),
and evidence100 of the authority of the signing trustee or trustees so to
sign for all should accompany the proxy. In case a trustee is a corporation, the requirements set forth above under the heading of "Corporations" should be observed if possible to do so. But it is permissible, if
the trustee prefers so to do, to have the proxy signed in the name of
such trustee by a trust officer or assistant trust officer.
104 Glahe v. Arnett, 38 Idaho 736, 225 P. 796 (1924) (certified copy of letters
required when executor, administrator, or guardian petitions for a stockholders'
meeting).
105 In People ex rel. Courtney v. Botts, 376 Ill. 476 at 484, 34 N. E. (2d) 403
(1941), where the will of William Schmidt placed the title to the stock involved in
two trustees, the court said, "they must act jointly, or one give the other a proxy."
106 Such, for example, as a copy of the deed· of trust or will.
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VI
DUTY OF INSPECTORS OF ELECTION

The evolutionary phase of the modern corporation in recent Jegal
history is too well known to require additional comment. And as might
be .expected from the change in setting from the corporation with a
few hundred stockholders to one where the stock is widely scattered
among tens of thousands of _shareholders, many of the principles developed for an earlier day corporation are impracticable today. This
is especially true of many of the rules the courts apply in respect to
determining the duties of inspectors of elections. Most of these principles emerged when corporations were small and the inspectors or
judges of ele~tions were acquainted personally with many, if not all,
the stockholders.107 Furthermore, before considering in detail the
duties of inspectors of elections, it is important to note two matt~rs.
The first of these is that a meeting of the shareholders of a corporation
is a business meeting, not a judicial proceeding. Secondly, the inspectors
of elections are usually laymen and are called upon to exercise good
business judgment, not judgment of a judicial nature.
Obviously the inspectors should perform their duties in such a·
manner as to make future litigation unnecessary. It is important, therefore, to determine when and for what reasons they may reject a proxy
and with what standards they must comply to determine a contest
expeditiously and finally. Since the decisions of the inspectors must
be made summarily, they cannot be required to inquire too meticulously
into the validity of the proxy. The existence of these conditions, therefore, are sufficient justification for a presumption of regularity of
proxies and warrant a brief survey of the cases in which the courts have
considered the problem of presumptions and inferences in respect to the
authenticity and genuineness of proxies.

A. Presumptions and Inferences
A proxy regular on its face and apparently signed by the shareholder who is entitled to vote, is presumed to be authentic and genuine
107 In Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A.
(2d) ,743 at 749, where the petitioners objected to the inspectors accepting unsworn
statements of third persons concerning the presence of shareholders, the Vice Chancellor
said, "In the case of lJ.10st corporations having numerous stockholders, it is unlikely that
inspectors could be found who would be able to recognize at sight all, or even a large
part, of the shareholders. Practical necessity requires that inspectors be authorized to
.employ reasonable means to ascertain the identity and number of stockholders present."
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in the absence of proof to the contrary.108 And before the inspectors
are justified in refusing such a proxy, evidence as to its invalidity must
be introduced. Likewise, where a proxy is received by the inspectors
signed in the name of a person who is entitled to vote, there is sufficient evidence of the stockholder's authorship to justify the inspectors
accepting the proxy.109
This raises a very practical question: when a proxy is signed by
someone purporting to be an agent, executor, or trustee for the stockholder of record, or where the proxy is signed by one of several trustees,
executors or administrators, is there sufficient evidence of the genuineness and authenticity of the instrument to justify the inspectors accepting the proxy without demanding additional evidence as to the
authority of the person signing? Where proxies are accepted and acted
upon as regular by the inspectors, and no objection is made as to the
form; execution or validity, the courts have held that the proxies are
entitled to be taken as regularly executed and given by persons entitled
to vote.110 Since such evidence is sufficient to satisfy the courts that the
person signing as agent had the necessary authority so to sign, it would
seem that the inspectors would be justified in drawing the inference
that the person signing as agent for the stockholder had the authority
or power so to sign. And this seems especially true when the practical
aspects of the situation are considered. For example, the proxy has
been stenciled with the name of the owner of the stock and mailed to
him.111 The probability'that a person without authority or power signed
and returned the proxy for the owner seems very small. Furthermore,
if a stockholder chooses to object to the. acceptance of a proxy on the
ground that a signature is not genuine or that the proxy is not authentic,
he may do so by supplying evidence to substantiate his contention.
108 In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882); In re Cecil,
36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 477 (1869); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N. Y.
S. 61 (1925); ,Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A.
136 (1933); Stevens v. Emergency Hospital of Easton, 142 Md. 526, 121 A. 475
(1923); People ex rel. Chritzman v. Crossley, 69 Ill. 195 (1873); White v. New
York State Agricultural Society, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 580 (1887).
109 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933).
110 People ex rel. Chritzman v. Crossley, 69 Ill. 195 (1873); Stevens v. Emergency Hospital of Easton, 142 Md. 526, 121 A._475 (1923); Gentry-Futch Co.
v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925).
111 It is a common practice for corporations to use printed post card proxies.
These are mailed by the corporation with the proxy solicitation to shareholders registered on the corporate books. On each, a line for signature is provided, and beneath
1:he line appears the stenciled name and address of a shareholder as these appear on
:the books.
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Closely related to the above question is the problem of what evidence, if any, is necessary to establish the authority of an officer or a
member of a firm to execute a proxy, when such proxy is tendered in
the name of a corporation or a partnership. The text books and the cases
agree that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, when any action
purports to have been taken by the corporate officers or the member~
of a partnership, ·it is sufficient evidence to import the regularity of
such acts.112 And as already indicated, where a proxy is signed in the
name of a corporation or a partnership, and it is neither signed by all
the members of the firm nor attended with all the formalities required
for the execution of solemn corporate acts, it nevertheless is entitled to
be taken as presumptively genuine.113
Presumptions as to the authority of a proxy holder may also be
. based upon the ordinary course of conduct of the owner of the stock.
Thus, the act of the customer permitting his stock to stand in the
broker's name raises a presumption that authority has been obtained
by the broker to vote the stock.114 And where the proxy holder acts for
the own,er of the stock, a presumption exists that the acts performed by
the proxy holder in the proper exercise of the authority conferred expresses the will and pleasure of the owner.115 Likewise, a presumption
exists that the grantor of the proxy authorizes his proxy holder to fill in
blank spaces left in the instrument: 116 Continued usage permitting voting by proxy has also been held to raise a presumption that such method
is legal.111 So, too, insanity of a stockholder, when established, raises a
presumption that the insanity continues until the contrary is proved.118
As used in connection with the procedural aspects of the vote by proxy,
1129 FLETC~ER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 4601 (1931); BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS 340 (1927); Summit Silk Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. of Baltimore, 88 N. J. Eq. 113, 101 A. 573 (1917), affd. 89 N. J. Eq. 582, 105 A. 895
(1918); Barrell v. Lake View Land Co., 122 Cal. 129, 54 P. 594 (1898); Trifeld v.
Winchester Development Co., io5 N. J. Eq. 50, 146 A. 873 (1928); Georgia Granite
R.R. v. Miller, 144 Ga. 665, 87 S. E. 897 (1915); Noller v. Wright, 138 Mich. 416,
101 N. W. 553 (1904); In re Mohawk & H. R. R., 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 135 (1838);
Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933);
Gentry-Futch v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925).
113 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933).
114 ln re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey, (D. C. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 329.
115 Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 145 A. 115 (1929).
116 Ex parte Duce, 13 Ch. D. 429 (1879).
117 Monsseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Ann. 482 (1867).
118 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933).
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the word presumption is obviously employed in the sense of a permissive and not a mandatory one.119

B. Matters of Evidence
The fact that a person.executes a proxy has been held to be prima
facie evidence of his membership in a corporation.120 Similarly, ownership of stock by a married woman has been deemed sufficient evidence
to satisfy the courts that her stock was represented at the meeting of
the stockholders by her husband, who acted as her agent.121 The record
minute books of a corporation have been considered to be prima facie
evidence of the acts of a corporation recorded therein.122 Likewise, some
courts take the view that the transfer books are prima facie evidence of
the stockholders entitled to vote at the meetings of the stockholders.128
Some courts, on the other hand, take the view that the transfer books
are conclusive upon the question who are entitled to vote.124 The mere
fact that a stockholder votes his own stock at the meeting of the sha'reholders is no evidence that he intended to express the consent of the
stockholders whom he represented as agent.125 Nor is it necessary to
119 It is not always clear in what sense the courts are using the term presumption.
If it is their intention to attach to the facts certain procedural consequences, then they
are using the term in the sense of a true presumption. See, 9 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., § 2491 (1940). On the other hand, presumption may be used in the sense
of inference. If used in the latter sense, the courts mean nothing more than that a
rational inference may be drawn from the particular facts. See id. It is probable, however, that a real presumption is meant to be predicated in the cases cited in notes 114
to II 7 inclusive, supra.
120 Harger v. McCullough, 2 Denio ll9 (N. Y. 1846). Cf. Duquesne Bond
Corp. v. American Surety Co., 264 Pa. 203, 107 A. 759 (1919).
121 Florida Clay Co. v. Vause, 57 Fla. 407, 49 So. 35 (1909). Contra: Steele
v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining Co., 42 Colo. 529, 95 P. 349 (1908).
122 Farwell v. Houghton Copper Works, (C. C. Mich. 1881) 8 F. 66; In re
Indian Zoedone Co., 26 Ch. D. 70 (1884).
128 State ex rel. White v. Ferris, 42 Conn. 560 ('1875); Haynes v. Griffith, 16
Idaho 280; IOI P. 728 (1909); Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 152 Pa. St. 217, 25 A.
535 (1893).
124 Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N. W. 547 (1893);
Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402 (1827); Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 743; Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co.,
15 Cal. (2d) 220, uo P. {2d) 765 (1940), superseding (Cal. App. 1939) 92 P.
(2d) 917; State ex rel. Johnson v. Heap, I Wash. (2d) 316, 95 P. (2d) 1039
(1939); People ex rel. Courtney v. Botts, 376 Ill. 476, 34 N. E. (2d) 403 (1941).
Generally, the modern corporation statute makes the stock records conclusive upon
election officers as to the right vote.
125 Steiner v. Steiner Land & Lumber Co., 120 Ala. 128, 26 So. 494 (1897).
See also Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N. E.
609 (1926).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 41

show that search has been made for writings appointing proxy holders
before admitting secondary evidence of the contents of the proxies.120
Furthermore, proof of authority to execute a proxy to vote at an .election of directors not shown to the inspectors will not be received by the
courts to establish the allegation of an erroneous rejection of votes.127

C. Duties
Inspectors are not a judicial body and their office, therefore, is a
ministerial and not a judicial one. In Commonwealth ex rel. J. H.
Grier v. Coxe,1 28 wherein the inspectors had rejected c·ertain proxies
because they were informed the proxies had been secured 'through false
representations, the'court said that the inspectors had no power to hear,
investigate and determine alleged frauds, unless authorized to carry on
such an investigation by the party in interest, otherwise they would be
usurping judicial power. Nor is. it their duty to determine whether or
not tlie proxies empower the proxy holders to vote in favor of amending the by-laws of the corporation.129 Where the validity of a proxy
is nQt contested and is apparently the act of the stockholder, and regular on its face, the inspectors must accept the vote of the proxy holder.130
Inspectors have no right to require a stockholder to furnish affidavits
or take an oath as to the ownership or hypothecation of the stock to
prove his right to vote.131 Neither can the inspectors reject a proxy because it is not acknowledged or proved,132 or because of blanks left in
the proxy for the day and month of execution.133 Nor can they refuse
_to accept proxies tendered after the polls are closed when such an omission is called to their attention before the result of the vote is announced.184
The standard of conduct imposed on the inspectors in their adminis126 Haywood & Pittsborough Plank Road Co. v. Bryan, 6 Jones L. (51 N. C.)
82 (1858).
127 In re Mohawk & H. R.R., 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 135 (1838).
128 1 Leg. Chron. 89 (Pa.) 89 (1873). See also Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3
Serg. & R. (Pa.) 29 (1817); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 2n N. Y. S. 61
(1925); In re Mohawk & H. R.R., 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 135 (1838); Bache v. Central
Leather Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 484, 81 A. 571 (19n).
·
129 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933) •.
130 In re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 477 (1869).
181 People v. Tibbets, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 358 (1825) ..
18Zln re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 477 (1869); In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
183 In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
m, Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N. Y. S. 61 (1925).
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tration of the voting is one of reasonableness. Before they are justified
in rejecting a proxy they are bound to resort to all reasonable means
of satisfying themselves of its authenticity.135 But it is not necessary to
delay the election so that witnesses may be brought and testimony taken
in order to determine the validity of the proxies.136 Objections to the
validity of the proxy must be supported by proof or the presumptions
as to the authenticity and genuineness will prevail.
In view of the great loss that may be occasioned the stockholders
of a corporation as the result of the uncertainty of policy to be maintained by the management in control when there is a possibility that
another group will be put in charge if the courts rule that certain proxies
were improperly rejected or accepted, as the case may be, more definite rules are needed to 'guide the inspectors in the exercise of their
ministerial duties. The enactment of statutes setting forth not only
the duties and powers. of the inspectors but also standards by which
the validity of the proxies presented to the meetings can be determined
are recommended.181 And in lieu of the enactment of such statutes, corporations should include provisions in their by-laws covering these
exigencies.
(To be concluded in a subsequent issue.)
ln re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
Pope v. Whitridge, I Io Md. 468, 73 A. 28 I ( I 909).
181 Statutes dealing with the power and duties of inspectors of election for the
most part fail to establish a standard whereby the right to vote in person or by proxy
can be settled at the meeting when the person offering to vote by proxy is challenged.
For example, the New York General Corporation Law, N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1929), tit. 22, § 20, provides: "Any person offering to vote as proxy shall present his
proxy and, if so challenged, take and subscribe the following oath: 'I do solemnly swear
that I have not, either directly, indirectly or impliedly, given any promise or any
sum of money or anything of value to induce the giving of a proxy to me to vote at
this meeting, or received any promise or any sum of money or any thing of value
to influence the giving of my vote at this meeting, or as a consideration therefor.' The
inspectors or persons presiding at the election may administer such oath, and all such
oaths and proxies shall be filed in the office of the corporation. A member or proxy
who shall fail to take such oath when so challenged shall not be permitted to vote."
135

136

